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Walrasian Dynamics in Multi-unit Markets ∗
Simina Braˆnzei† Aris Filos-Ratsikas‡
Abstract
In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them
to a set of buyers that have monetary endowments. While a Walrasian equilibrium does
not always exist in this model, natural relaxations of the concept that retain its desirable
fairness properties do exist.
We study the dynamics of (Walrasian) envy-free pricing mechanisms in this environment,
showing that for any such pricing mechanism, the best response dynamic starting from
truth-telling converges to a pure Nash equilibrium with small loss in revenue and welfare.
Moreover, we generalize these bounds to capture all the Nash equilibria for a large class of
(monotone) pricing mechanisms. We also identify a natural mechanism, which selects the
minimum Walrasian envy-free price, in which for n = 2 buyers the best response dynamic
converges from any starting profile, and for which we conjecture convergence for any number
of buyers.
1 Introduction
The question of allocating scarce resources among participants with heterogeneous preferences
is one of the most important problems faced throughout the history of human society, starting
from millenary versions—such as the division of land—to modern variants—such as allocating
computational resources to the users of an organization or selling goods in eBay auctions. A
crucial development in answer to this question occurred with the invention of money, i.e. of
pricing mechanisms that aggregate information about the supply and demand of the goods
in order to facilitate trade. The price mechanism was formalized and studied systematically
starting with the 19th century, in the works of Fisher [BS00], [Wal74] and [AD54].
The basic setting is that of a set of participants that come to the market with their initial
endowments and aim to purchase goods in a way that maximizes their utility subject to the
initial budget constraints. Walrasian equilibria are outcomes where demand and supply meet,
have been shown to exist under mild conditions when the goods are perfectly divisible, and
satisfy very desirable efficiency properties (see, e.g., [AD54, NRTV07]).
The beautiful general equilibrium theory rests on several idealized conditions that are not
always met. In particular, the real world is fraught with instances of allocating indivisible goods,
such as a house or a piece of jewelry. Walrasian equilibria can disappear in such scenarios, and
the classes of utilities for which they continue to exist are very small [KC82, GS99], requiring
among other things that buyers have essentially unbounded budgets of intrinsic value to them
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(i.e. monetary endowments so large as to always “cover” their valuations for the other goods in
the market). However this is a strong assumption that violates basic models such as the Fisher
and exchange market, where bounded endowments are an essential element of the profiles of
the agents [DLN12, AD54].
Nevertheless, we would like to retain at least partially the crisp predictions of Walrasian
equilibrium theory in the face of indivisibilities, such as the fairness properties1 of the pricing
and the fact that it allows each buyer to freely purchase their favorite bundle at those prices.
One method that has been proposed to accomplish this is relaxing the clearing requirement;
for instance, in the case of one seller that brings multiple goods, it can be acceptable that at
the end of the trade there are some leftover items in stock. The crucial optimality condition of
Walrasian equilibria can be maintained: each buyer purchases an optimal bundle at the current
prices. This notion of equilibrium is known as “(Walrasian) envy-free pricing” and refers to
the fact that no buyer should “envy” any bundle that it could afford in the market [GHK+05].
Envy-free pricing is guaranteed to exist in very general models and the question becomes to
compute one that recovers some of the efficiency properties of exact Walrasian equilibria.
A high level scenario motivating our analysis is an online marketplace where a seller posts
goods for sale, while interested buyers compete for obtaining them by submitting bids that signal
their interest in the goods. The buyers have time to repeatedly update their bids after seeing
the bids submitted by others, in order to get better allocations for themselves or potentially
lower the price. This process continues until a stable state is reached, point at which the seller
allocates the goods based on the final bids. We are interested in understanding the outcomes
at the stable states of this dynamic in multi-unit markets, and in particular in quantifying the
social welfare of the participants and revenue extracted by the seller.
Multi-unit auctions have been advocated as a lens to the entire field of (algorithmic) mech-
anism design [Nis14] and our scenario is in fact an environment where repeated best-response
provides reasonable approximation guarantees”, stated explicitly as a future research question
by Nisan et al. [NSVZ11].
1.1 Our Results
We study the (Walrasian) envy-free pricing problem in one of the most basic scenarios possible,
namely linear multi-unit markets with budgets. There is one seller who comes equipped with m
units of some good (e.g. chairs), while the buyers bring their budgets. The seller has no value
for the items, while the buyers value both their money and the goods.
The buyers are strategic and a mechanism for envy-free pricing will have to elicit the valua-
tions from the buyers. The budgets are known. In the economics literature, budgets are viewed
as hard information (quantitative), as opposed to preferences, which represent soft information
and are more difficult to verify (see, e.g., [Pet04]). Bulow, Levin and Milgrom [BLM09] provide
an example of such an inference in a real-life actions. Known budgets are also studied in the
auctions literature [DLN12, FLSS11, LR96].
Our goal is to understand the best response dynamics as well as the entire Nash equilibrium
set of such a mechanism, together with the social welfare and revenue attained at the stable
states. For the best response dynamic, we assume that at each step of the process a buyer
observes the bids of others, then updates its own bid optimally given the current state of the
market. For the Nash equilibrium set, we will consider equilibria in which the buyers do not
overbid.2 Our results are for (Walrasian) envy-free pricing mechanisms and can be summarized
as follows.
1One such fairness property is envy-freeness.
2We discuss and motivate this assumption in detail in Section 4.
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Theorem 1.1 (Convergence). Let A be any mechanism. Then the best response dynamic start-
ing from the truth-telling profile converges to a pure Nash equilibrium of A. Compared to the
truth-telling outcome, the equilibrium reached has the property that
• the utility of each buyer is (weakly) higher, and
• the number of units received by each buyer is (weakly) larger, possibly with the exception
of the last deviator.
The best response may cycle when starting from a non-truthful profile.
Our next theorem shows that convergence can be slow in the worst case. Note the input to
the mechanism (i.e. valuations and budgets) are drawn from a discretized domain (i.e. a grid),
while the price is selected from an output domain that is also discretized.3
Theorem 1.2 (Lower bound on convergence time). (informal) There exists a mechanism such
that for arbitrary (but fixed) market parameters, the best response dynamic takes Ω(1/) steps
to converge, where  > 0 is the maximum distance between consecutive entries in the input and
output domains.
On the positive side, we identify a natural class of “consistent” mechanisms, containing welfare
and revenue maximizing (and approximating) ones, for which convergence is much faster.
Theorem 1.3 (Convergence time of consistent mechanisms). For any consistent mechanism
A, the best response dynamic starting from the truth-telling profile converges to a pure Nash
equilibrium of A in at most n steps.
We also quantify the social welfare and revenue attained at the end of the best response process.
Some of our bounds use the notion of budget share, which captures the level of competition
in the market by quantifying the effect that the budget of a single buyer can have on the
revenue. The more competitive the market is, the smaller the budget share (for similar notions
of competitiveness, see [CT16, DLN12]).
Theorem 1.4 (Revenue and welfare of the dynamic starting from truth-telling). Let A be any
mechanism. Then the best response dynamic starting from truth-telling has the property that
the Nash equilibrium reached, compared to the truth-telling state, is such that:
• the (additive) loss in social welfare (compared to the maximum possible) is at most the
maximum budget.
• the revenue is approximated within a (multiplicative) factor of at least (β − α) /2, where
β ∈ [0, 1] is the approximation ratio of mechanism A for the optimal revenue and α is the
budget share of the market.
We show that similar approximation guarantees hold for all the (non-overbidding) Nash equi-
libria of monotone mechanisms.
Theorem 1.5 (Revenue and welfare in any non-overbidding Nash equilibrium). Let A be a
monotone mechanism. Then in any pure Nash equilibrium of A where buyers do not overbid,
compared to the truth-telling outcome of A:
• the (additive) loss in welfare is at most γA ·B∗, where B∗ is the maximum budget
3Note that if the input and output domain are continuous, the best response may not be well defined; see
Example 2.
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• the revenue is approximated within a multiplicative factor of at least (β − γA · α) /2,
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the approximation ratio of the mechanism A for the optimal revenue
and α is the budget share of the market
such that γA is the maximum number of buyers that can receive partial allocations by A.
The notion of “partial” allocations refers to buyers that are indifferent between multiple
bundles.4 A partial allocation for a buyer is a bundle that is neither the largest in its demand
nor the smallest. In principle if a mechanism gives to many buyers bundles that are neither the
largest nor the smallest desired by that buyer, the revenue and welfare of that mechanism can
vanish in the equilibrium. We identify natural mechanisms, such as with greedy allocation rules
(which take the indifferent buyers in some order and allocate each of them fully before moving
to the next one), for which the number of buyers receiving partial allocations is at most 1.
Finally, we study the All-or-Nothing mechanism, which selects the minimum (Walrasian)
envy-free price and allocates the semi-hungry buyers either all the units they can afford or none.
Theorem 1.6. For n = 2 buyers, the best-response dynamic starting from any profile of the
All-Or-Nothing mechanism converges to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Figure 1: The convergence properties of the All-Or-Nothing mechanism when the dynamic
starts from 100 different arbitrary profiles, for n = 25,m = 20. The budgets are drawn uniformly
at random from [1, 125]. The differently coloured lines indicate different starting profiles s(0).
This mechanism was shown to be both truthful and to simultaneously approximate the
optimal revenue and welfare revenue within constant factors (at the truthful state) in previous
work [BFRMZ17]. Using our theorems above, since the mechanism is monotonic, we get the
following performance guarantees for All-or-Nothing:
Corollary 1. In every non-overbidding equilibrium of All-Or-Nothing, for any number of
buyers,
- the (additive) loss in welfare is at most the maximum budget,
4In this model, the buyers that are indifferent among multiple bundles are precisely those whose valuation
exactly matches the price, and their demand set contains all the bundle sizes that they can afford at that price.
Note the buyers whose valuation is strictly higher than the price want the maximum number of units they can
afford, while the buyers whose valuation is strictly lower than the price want zero units, so for these two latter
types the allocations are never “partial”.
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- the revenue is approximated within a (multiplicative) factor of at least min {0.25 , (1− α)/2}−
α/2 where α is the budget share of the market.
In particular, in competitive markets (where α approaches 0), mechanism All-Or-Nothing
approximates the optimal revenue within a factor of 4 in any non-overbidding equilibrium.
1.2 Related work
The notion of the Walrasian equilibrium was formulated and studied systematically as early
as the beginning of the 19th century, with the foundational works of Fisher [BS00], [Wal74],
and [AD54]. Its simple pricing scheme and it superior fairness properties, have lead to the
employement of the Walrasian equilibrium as an auction mechanism for selling goods [GHK+05,
BLNPL14]. The 2000 SMRA auction for 3G licences to UK providers (coined as “The Biggest
Auction Ever” in [BK02]) as well as the Product-Mix auction [Kle10] run by the Bank of England
are prime real-life examples of the employment of Walrasian pricing mechanisms.
Mechanisms for Walrasian pricing have been studied in the literature for various settings,
with the focus being mainly on computational issues, i.e. designing polynomial time mechanisms
to achieve good approximations for the revenue and the social welfare objectives [FFLS12,
MSZ15, CS08, BBM08]. Crucially, most of these works do not take the incentives of buyers into
account. Our results provide worst-case guarantees for all mechanisms for the setting of linear
multi-unit auctions with budgets.
The multi-unit model is central in combinatorial auctions and has been studied in a large
body of literature [DN07, DLN12, FFLS12, DN15, BCI+05, BGN03, GML13, DHP17], in par-
ticular for the case of additive valuations [DLN12, FFLS12]. The literature on best-response
dynamics on games is rich [Rou09, CS07, AAE+08], with questions raised about convergence
and convergence time and the properties of the equilibrium which is reached as the results of
the dynamic. A line of work has also considered best-response dynamics in auctions [DK17,
NSVZ11, CDE+08, BBN17, CD11, CDE+14]; this is relevant to this work as pricing mechanisms
in our setting can be seen as simple and fair auction mechanisms for selling indivisible goods.
Our work is also related to the literature on understanding dynamics of auctions under
behavioral assumptions such as no-regret learning and equilibria of auctions (e.g. for Nash,
correlated, and coarse-correlated equilibria) with corresponding price of anarchy bounds; see,
e.g. the work of [RST17, DS16, MT12, HKMN11, BR11, LB10]. One could view our results
in Section 3 as dynamic Price of Anarchy results [BCMP13] and the results in Section 4 as
undominated Price of Anarchy results [CKK+15]. Our setting is also related to an ascending
auction proposed by Ausubel [Aus04], in which the price keeps increasing while the buyers reduce
their demands accordingly, with the feature that whenever the total demand of all except one
of the bidders (say i) drops below the supply, the remaining items are allocated to bidder i at
the current price. Unlike Ausubel’s auction, we study auctions in which the items (which are
identical units) are allocated at the same price to everyone.
Contrary to some of the related work on dynamics (e.g. see [Kes16]), we do not need to make
any assumptions about the order in which the buyers best-respond; our results are independent
of this order. A summary on dynamics for deciding the allocation of public goods can be found
in [Laf87]. Best response dynamics starting from the true profile have been studied before in
voting (see, e.g. [BCMP13, MPRJ10]). We emphasize here that while a truthful mechanism with
good welfare and revenue guarantees exists for our setting [BFRMZ17], providing guarantees
for very general classes of mechanisms as we do here is quite important, as the mechanisms
that might actually be employed in reality might not be truthful. A prominent example of
this phenomenon is the Generalized Second Price Auction, which is actually used in practice
in favour of its famous truthful counter-part, the VCG mechanism (see [NRTV07]) and in
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fact, understanding such non-truthful mechanisms theoretically has been a focus of the related
literature [CKK+15, dKMST13]
Finally, the question of understanding what can be achieved with item pricing is particularly
important given the recent emphasis on the theme of complexity versus simplicity in mechanism
design [HR09], which is inspired by the computational perspective. Item pricing is a qualitative
notion of simple pricing (as opposed to more complex pricing schemes, such as pricing different
bundles arbitrarily), and is frequently used for selling goods in supermarkets. More formal
definitions of complexity include communication and time, while recently notions of simplicity
have been proposed specifically for economic environments, such as the menu-size of auctions
[HN13], or simplicity in the sense that participants can easily reason about the mechanism’s
properties, studied using a framework of verifiable mechanisms [BP15] and obvious strategy-
proofness [Li17].
2 Model and Preliminaries
A linear multi-unit market is composed of a set N = {1, . . . , n} of buyers and one seller that
brings m (indivisible) units of a good. Each buyer i has a budget5 Bi > 0, and a valuation vi
per unit, such that the value of buyer i for k units is vi · k. The seller has no value for the units
and its goal is to extract money from the buyers, while the buyers value both the money and
the good and their goal is to maximize their utility by purchasing units of the good as long as
the transaction is profitable.
The seller will set a price p per unit, such that any buyer can purchase k units at a price
of k · p. The outcome of the market will be a pair (x, p), where p is the unit price and x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Zn+ is an allocation, with the property that xi is the number of units received by
buyer i and
∑n
i=1 xi ≤ m.
The utility of buyer i for receiving k units at price p is:
ui(p, k) =
{
vi · k − p · k, if p · k ≤ Bi
−∞, otherwise
The demand of a buyer i at price p is defined as the set of optimal bundles for the buyer given
the price and its budget. Since the units are indistinguishable, the demand set will simply
contain all the bundle sizes that the buyer would maximally prefer:
Di(p) =

{
min
{
bBip c,m
}}
, if vi > p{
0, 1, . . . ,min
{
bBip c,m
}}
, if vi = p
{0}, if vi < p.
Thus, if the valuation is higher than the price per unit, the buyer demands as many units as it
can afford (up to exhausting all the units), while if the valuation is lower, the buyer wants zero
units.
A buyer i is said to be hungry at a price p if vi > p, semi-hungry if vi = p, interested if
vi ≥ p, and uninterested if vi < p.
Walrasian (Envy-Free) Pricing: An allocation and price (x, p) represent an envy-free pricing
6 if the price per unit is p and xi ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ N , i.e. each buyer gets a number of units
5Monetary endowment of intrinsic value to all the buyers and the seller.
6We note that more complex forms of envy-free pricing are possible, such as setting a different price per
bundle, but our focus will be on the simplest type of unit pricing.
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in its demand set at p. A price p is an envy-free price if there exists an allocation x such that
(x, p) is an envy-free pricing. An allocation x can be supported at price p if there is an envy-free
pricing (x, p).
While an envy-free pricing can always be obtained (e.g. set p = 1 + B1 + . . . + Bn), it is
not necessarily possible to sell all the units in an envy-free way as can be seen from the next
example.
Example 1 (Non-existence of envy-free clearing prices). Consider a market with m = 3 units
and two buyers, Alice and Bob, with valuations vAlice = vBob = 1.1 and budgets BAlice = BBob =
1. At any price p > 0.5, no more than 2 units can be sold in total due to budget constraints. At
p ≤ 0.5, both Alice and Bob are interested and want at least 2 units each, but there are only 3
units in total.
Mechanisms and Objectives: We study envy-free pricing mechanisms and will be interested
in the social welfare of the buyers and the revenue of the seller. An mechanism A for envy-free
pricing receives as input a market M = (v,B,m) and outputs an envy-free pricing (x, p). The
valuations are private and will be elicited by A from the agents. The budgets and number of
units are known.
The social welfare at an envy-free pricing (x, p) is the total value of the buyers for the goods
allocated to them, while the revenue is the amount of money received by the seller, respectively:
SW(x, p) =
n∑
i=1
vi · xi, REV(x, p) =
n∑
i=1
xi · p.
Incentives: Buyers are rational agents who strategize when reporting their valuations, in order
to gain better allocations at a lower price. The truthful valuation profile will be denoted by
v = (v1, . . . , vn). However, each buyer i can report any number v
′
i ∈ <+ as a value, and this
will be its strategy.
Given a mechanism A and market M = (v,B,m), a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) is a
pure Nash equilibrium (or simply an equilibrium) if no buyer i can find an alternative strategy
s′i that would improve its utility under mechanism A, given that the strategies of the other
buyers are fixed.
Discrete Domain: The valuations and the budgets come from a discrete domain (an infinite
grid): V = {k ·  | k ∈ N} for some  > 0. An mechanism will be allowed to choose the price
from an output grid W = {k · δ | k ∈ N}, for some δ > 0.
If the input and output domains are continuous, the best-response may not be well-defined.
Example 2 (Best-response dynamic). Consider a market with m = 2 units and two buyers,
Alice and Bob, with valuations vAlice = vBob = 2 and budgets BAlice = BBob = 2. Consider
a mechanism A that selects the second-highest valuation as the price and allocates the semi-
hungry buyers by taking them in lexicographic order and giving each as many units as possible
before moving to the next one. Then the price set by A is p = 2, with allocation xAlice = 2 and
xBob = 0.
If Alice deviates to sAlice = 1, then Alice receives 0 units, since Bob will demand 2 units. At
any report sAlice > 1, Alice receives 1 unit for a strictly positive utility and therefore to minimize
the price Alice would have to find the minimum number in the open set (1,∞). Finally, any
report sAlice > 2 would result in Alice having negative utility, while a report sAlice < 1 would
result in her getting no units for a utility of zero, and so no improvement compared to the truth
telling outcome.
On the other hand, on the discrete domain, Alice has a best response by deviating to reported
valuation 1 + , case in which the profile (1 + , 2) is a pure Nash equilibrium.
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3 Dynamics
In this section, we consider best-response dynamics and will focus on the truth-telling profile
as a natural starting point of the dynamic. Given a market M = (v,B,m), we will denote by
Hp(v), Sp(v), and Ip(v) the hungry, semi-hungry, and interested buyers at p, respectively. For
a strategy profile s, s−i will denote the strategy profile of all other buyers except the i’th one.
The omitted proofs from this section can be found in Appendix A.
Our main theorem in this section is that the best response dynamic always converges to a
pure Nash equilibrium when starting from the truth telling profile.
Theorem 3.1 (Convergence). Let A be any mechanism. Then the best response dynamic start-
ing from the truth-telling profile converges to a pure Nash equilibrium of A. Compared to the
truth-telling outcome, the Nash equilibrium reached has the property that
• the utility of each buyer is (weakly) higher, and
• the number of units received by each buyer is (weakly) larger, possibly with the exception
of the last deviator.
Proof. For any step k in the best response process, let sk = (sk1, . . . , s
k
n) be the vector of
valuations reported by all the buyers at k, and pk the price output by A in this round. For
k = 0 we have s0 = v as the initial (true) valuations. We show by induction the following
properties:
1. The price strictly decreases throughout the best response process, i.e. pk−1 > pk for every
step k ≥ 0.
2. The buyers that appear hungry at pk, i.e. Hpk(sk), are also hungry at this price with
respect to their true valuations, i.e. vi > p
k for all i ∈ Hpk(sk). The buyers that appear
semi-hungry at pk, i.e. Spk(sk), have not changed their inputs, possibly with the exception
of the last deviator, whose true valuation is greater or equal to pk. The buyers that appear
uninterested at pk are honest, i.e. N \ Ipk(sk) is such that ski = vi for all i ∈ Ipk(sk).
At k = 0 property 1) holds trivially since there is no previous price (we can define p−1 = ∞),
while 2) holds for the truth-telling valuations. Suppose properties (1− 2) hold for all steps up
to k − 1. We show they also hold at step k. Let i be the buyer that deviates in step k to some
valuation ski . Let v
k
j = v
k−1
j for all buyers j 6= i and pk the new price selected by A on input
vk. We consider a few cases depending on the deviating buyer.
Case 1: Buyer i appears hungry in round k − 1: sk−1i > pk−1. By the induction hypothesis,
i ∈ Hpk−1(sk−1), and so vi > pk−1. Then buyer i receives a maximal allocation in round k − 1
given the price. If i increases the price in round k, i.e. pk > pk−1, this can only result in buyer
i getting (weakly) fewer units at a higher price, which worsens i’s utility compared to round
k − 1. This cannot be a best response. Similarly, if i’s deviation resulted in the same price for
round k, pk = pk−1, buyer i would receive at most as many units at the same price, which is
also not an improvement. Thus it must be the case that pk < pk−1.
Moreover, buyer i’s new valuation cannot be smaller than pk since that would result in i
getting no units in round k, which cannot be better than round k−1 where buyer i was hungry
with respect to its true value. Since vi > p
k−1 > pk, we get ski ≥ pk and vi > pk. The set
Hpk(sk) of buyers that appear hungry in round k contains, in addition to possibly buyer i, also
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• the buyers in Hpk−1(sk−1)\{i}, which remain hungry with respect to their true valuations
in round k since the price decreased compared to round k− 1 while their reports have not
changed,
• the buyers with valuations sk−1i ∈ (pk, pk−1), which are honest in round k− 1 and remain
honest in round k, with true values strictly above pk, since none of them deviated in
between.
The set Spk(sk) of buyers that appear semi-hungry in round k contains only buyers that were
honest in round k − 1, possibly with the exception of i. Thus all the buyers in Spk(sk) \ {i}
have their true (and reported) valuations equal to pk. If buyer i deviates to ski = p
k, then by
previous arguments, vi > p
k. Finally, the buyers N \ Ipk(sk) that appear uninterested in round
k were honest in round k− 1 and remain so in round k, since the deviator i is not one of them.
Thus properties (1-2) hold in round k.
Case 2: Buyer i appears semi-hungry in round k − 1: sk−1i = pk−1. By the description of
Spk−1(sk−1), if buyer i is not honest in round k− 1, it must be the case that i was the deviator
in round k−1. If buyer i manages to strictly increase its utility from k−1 to k, then i’s input in
round k− 1 was not a best response to round k− 2, which is a contradiction. By the induction
hypothesis, it follows that buyer i is honest in round k−1. Then i cannot wish to keep the price
the same or increase it, since that would go above its true valuation, which is vi = s
k−1
i . Thus i
can only decrease the price, so pk < pk−1 and vi > pk. Similarly, for ski to be an improvement,
buyer i should appear interested on the new instance, so ski ≥ pk.
The set of buyers Hpk(sk), which appear hungry in round k, is a superset of Hpk−1(sk−1)
and contains all the buyers with valuations sk−1i in (p
k, pk−1), as well as i in case ski > p
k. The
set of semi-hungry buyers in round k, Spk(sk), contains only buyers that were honest in round
k − 1, possibly with the exception of buyer i in case ski = pk. Finally, the uninterested buyers
in round k, N \ Ipk(sk), form a subset of N \ Ipk−1(sk−1), were honest in round k− 1, and have
not changed their inputs in between. Thus the sets in round k satisfy the required properties
and the price decreased compared to round k − 1.
Case 3: Buyer i appears uninterested in round k − 1: sk−1i < pk−1. Then i ∈ N \ Ipk−1(sk−1),
which by the induction hypothesis only contains honest buyers. Then buyer i’s utility can
only improve by decreasing the price and appearing hungry or semi-hungry in the next round,
so pk < pk−1, ski ≥ pk, and vi > pk. Similarly to the previous cases, Hpk(sk) contains all
of Hpk+1(sk+1) (which continue to be hungry in round k with respect to both their true and
reported valuations), the buyers with valuations sk−1i ∈ (pk, pk−1) (which were honest in round
k − 1 and have not changed in between), and buyer i in case ski > pk (recall vi > pk). The set
Spk(sk) contains buyers which were honest in round k − 1 and have the same reports in round
k, possibly with the exception of buyer i in case ski = p
k. The set N \ Ipk(sk) is a subset of
N \ Ipk−1(sk−1), all of which were honest at k − 1 and kept the same valuations at k.
In all three cases, we obtain that properties (1 − 2) are maintained in round k, which
completes the proof by induction. Then the price strictly decreases in every iteration. Since the
price output is chosen from a discrete grid of non-negative entries, the best response process
either stops or reaches the smallest grid point available above zero. At this point the buyers
cannot decrease the price further, which implies there are no more best responses.
The improvement properties follow from the description of the sets Hpk(sk),Spk(sk), N \
Ipk(sk) in the round k where the best response process stops, which completes the argument.
The loss in the allocation of the last deviator is sometimes inevitable.
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Theorem 3.2 (Necessary allocation loss). There exist markets where the best response dynamic
of a mechanism converges to an allocation where some buyer loses units compared to the truth-
telling outcome.
In the worst case, convergence can be slow: the buyers can force a mechanism to traverse
the entire input grid by slowly decreasing their reported valuations with each iteration.
Theorem 3.3 (Lower bound on convergence time). There is a mechanism such that for arbi-
trary (fixed) market parameters M = (v,B,m), the best response dynamic takes Ω(1/) steps
to converge, where the distance between consecutive entries in both input and output domain is
at most  > 0 7.
Proof. Let  > 0. Consider the following mechanism, defined on an input grid with step size :
Almost – Top Mechanism:
Input : market with valuations v1 . . . vn and budgets B1 . . . Bn. The valuations are drawn
from an -grid, i.e. vi = ki · , where ki ∈ N for all i.
• Set the price to p = vi1 , where vi1 ≥ . . . vin .
• If vi1 −  is an envy-free price, adjust the price to p = vi1 − .
• Satisfy the demands of the hungry buyers at p, then allocate to the semi-hungry buyers
using greedy tie-breaking.
We claim the Almost-top mechanism forces the buyers to traverse the entire grid in the
worst case, which will give the required lower bound. First note the mechanism uses greedy tie-
breaking for the semi-hungry buyers. Consider any valuations v = (v1, . . . , vn) ≤ (v′1, . . . , v′n) =
v′, where the prices selected by the mechanism are p and p′, respectively. W.l.o.g., vi1 ≥
. . . ≥ vin and v′j1 ≥ . . . ≥ v′jn . If v′j1 > vi1 , since each value is a multiple of , we get
p′ ≥ v′j1−  ≥ vi1 ≥ p. Otherwise, v′j1 = vi1 . Then p, p′ ∈ {vi1 , vi1− }. Assume by contradiction
that p > p′, i.e. p = vi1 and p′ = v′j1 − . Since p′ is envy-free on v′ and v ≤ v′, p′ is also
envy-free on v. Moreover, p′ = vi1 − , so Almost-Top should have chosen p′ on v. This is a
contradiction, so p ≤ p′. Thus the Almost-Top mechanism is monotonic.
Given 0 <  < 1, consider an instance with n buyers, m = 4 units, valuations v1 = 1 + ,
v2 = 1, v3 = . . . = vn = , budgets B1 = B2 = 1 and B3 = . . . = Bn = . On this input,
Almost-top sets the price to p1 = 1, allocating one unit to each buyer. Then buyer 1 has a best
response at v′1 = 1− 1/N , since on input (v′1, v2), the mechanism sets the price to p′ = 1− 1/N ,
giving at least as many units to each buyer for a lower price. Note there is no valuation between
v′1 and v1, while any valuation lower than v′1 would still result in a price of p′; moreover. We
argue that buyer 2 then has a best response at v′′2 = 1− 2/N , since on input (1− 1/N, 1− 2/N)
the mechanism would set the price to p′′ = 1−2/N and give both buyers at least as many units
at a lower price. Again buyer 2 cannot move the price lower or get more units with any lower
valuation at this point. Iteratively, at every step k, one of the buyers has a best response at
the valuation 1− k/N . This process stops exactly at inputs (1/N, 2/N), which will result in a
price of 1/N , giving each buyer exactly 2N units. The price cannot drop any further since the
only valuation available that is lower than 1/N is zero, which would not change the price from
1/N . This completes the argument.
7E.g., the entries are at most -apart when the input and output domain are discretized to have the form
{k ·  | k ∈ N}.
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However, many natural mechanisms, such as ones that maximize or approximate welfare
and revenue [BFRMZ17, FFLS12]) converge faster, which we capture under the umbrella of
consistent mechanisms.
Definition 1. An mechanism A is consistent if the following holds. Let M = (v,B,m) be any
market on which A outputs a price p and an allocation x. Then in every marketM′ = (v′,B,m)
for which the sets of hungry and semi-hungry buyers are the same at p, A must output (p,x) as
well.
For such pricing mechanisms each buyer will only best respond at most once.
Theorem 3.4 (Convergence time of consistent mechanisms). Let A be any consistent mecha-
nism. The best response dynamic starting from the truth-telling profile converges to a pure Nash
equilibrium of A in at most n steps.
Finally, the best response dynamic can cycle when starting from non-truthful profiles.
Theorem 3.5 (Best-response cycles). There exist mechanisms for which the best response dy-
namic can cycle when starting from non-truthful profiles.
Proof. Consider an instance with 2 buyers, Alice and Bob, and 2 units with true valuations
vAlice = 1 ,vBob = 2 and budgets BAlice = BBob = 1.5. Consider the following envy-free pricing
mechanism A defined for two buyers:
Input: market (v,B,m)
- If BAlice = BBob = 1.5, then set the price as follows: pA(0.1, 0.3) = 0.2, pA(3, 0.3) =
0.9, pA(3, 2) = 1.5, pA(0.1, 2) = 0.5 and pA(vAlice, vBob) = max{vAlice, vBob} + 100,
otherwise. (Note that by this pricing scheme semi-hungry buyers never exist.)
- Otherwise, set the price to pA(vAlice, vBob) = maxi∈{Alice,Bob} vi. Allocate maximally
to the buyer with highest valuation, while giving no units to the buyer with the second
highest value. If there are ties, resolve them lexicographically.
Consider first the strategy profile (0.1, 0.3) where the price is 0.2. At this profile, Alice re-
ceives 0 units whereas Bob receives two units (since the demand of a buyer at a price p is
max{bBi/pc,m}. Thus Alice has a utility of zero while Bob has strictly positive utility.
The best response for Alice on this strategy profile is to respond by claiming that her value
is v′Alice = 3. On the new strategy profile (3, 0.3), the price will get updated to 0.9. Then Alice
will receive two units for a strictly positive utility, whereas Bob will now appear uninterested,
receiving zero units and getting a utility of zero.
Next, Bob can best respond by claiming that his value is 2 (which is his true valuation).
One the new strategy profile (3, 2) the price is 1.5 and both Alice and Bob appear to be hungry.
Note, however, that since their budgets are BAlice = BBob = 1.5 and the price is 1.5, there is
enough supply to accommodate both demands and each of them receives one unit. Bob’s true
valuation is 2 > 1.5 and so his utility is positive; on the other hand, Alice’s true valuation is
1 < 1.5 and her utility at this price is negative. For this reason, Alice will best-respond by
claiming that her value is 0.1. On the new strategy profile (0.1, 2), the price will be set to 0.5,
which is below Alice’s true valuation but above her reported valuation. At this price, Alice will
receive zero items and pay nothing for a utility of zero, while Bob will receive two units and get
a positive utility.
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Finally, Bob will best-respond by claiming that his value is 0.3, resulting in strategy profile
(0.1, 0.3), which coincides with the original profile, where the price is 0.2. At this price, Bob has
a higher utility than before, since it still appears to be hungry and still receives two units but
at a lower price. Thus we reach the profile that we started from, which completes the cycle.
One can see that the mechanism used in the proof of Theorem 3.5 has a rather strange
pricing rule. We would expect that mechanisms with more natural pricing and allocation rules
could converge from any starting state. To this end, we provide an example of a known natural
mechanism from the literature, the All-Or-Nothing mechanism [BFRMZ17], which (among
other desirable properties), enjoys such convergence guarantees, at least for the case of n = 2
buyers. We postpone the discussion until Section 5.
3.1 Social Welfare and Revenue
In this section, we will evaluate the effect of the dynamic on the social welfare and revenue
obtained by envy-free pricing mechanisms. We will show that the loss in the objectives is small
if the market is sufficiently competitive. To measure the level of competition, we define the
budget share of a market M = (v,B,m) as
α(M) = max
i∈N
Bi
REV(M) ,
where REV(M) is the maximum possible revenue for valuation profile v. Intuitively, the budget
share measures the fraction of the total revenue that a single buyer can be responsible for; this
number is small when the market is competitive. Similar notions of market competitiveness
have been studied before (see, e.g., [DLN12, CT16]).
We start by measuring the welfare loss due to the best-response dynamics.
Theorem 3.6 (Welfare of the dynamic from truth-telling). Let A be any mechanism. Then the
best response dynamic starting from the truth-telling profile converges to a pure Nash equilibrium
of A, whose loss in welfare compared to the truth-telling profile is at most the maximum budget.
Proof. Consider a market M = (v,B,m). For any valuation profile v˜, let pA(v˜) denote the
price and xAi (v˜) the allocation of buyer i computed by A given the market M′ = (v˜,B,m).
Let s be the strategy profile in the Nash equilibrium reached. By Theorem 3.1, there is only a
single buyer i ∈ N for which xAi (s) ≤ xAi (v) and the welfare loss is only due this buyer. From
Theorem 3.1, we know that on profile s, the utility of buyer i is at least as high as its utility on
the truth-telling profile v. In other words, (vi− pA(s)) ·xAi (s) ≥ (vi− pA(v)) ·xAi (v). Therefore,
we can bound the welfare loss as required by vi · (xAi (v)− xAi (s)) ≤ pA(v) · xAi (v) ≤ Bi, where
the last inequality follows from the definition of the budget.
We also measure the revenue loss due to the dynamic. The heart of the proof is in the
following argument: if we remove the last deviator from the market, we obtain a reduced market
with n − 1 buyers, for which we can show the equilibrium price of the original market is an
envy-free price.
We will say that a mechanism A is a β approximation for the revenue objective if for every
market M = (v,B,m), the revenue achieved by A on M is at least β times the maximum
revenue achieved by any envy-free pricing pair (x, p) on M.
Theorem 3.7 (Revenue of the dynamic from truth-telling). Let A be a mechanism that ap-
proximates the optimal revenue within a factor of β ∈ [0, 1] for every market. Consider any
market M = (v,B,m). Then in every Nash equilibrium of A reached through a best-response
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dynamic from truth-telling, the revenue is a (β − α) /2 approximation of the optimal revenue
for M, where α is the budget share of the market.
Proof. Given the market M = (v,B,m), for any strategy profile v˜ we define the following no-
tation. Let pA(v˜) denote the price and x
A
i (v˜) the allocation to buyer i computed by mechanism
A on input M˜ = (v˜,B,m). Additionally, let REVA(v˜,B) denote the revenue extracted by A on
M˜. For any envy-free price p of M˜, let REV(v˜,B, p) denote the maximum possible revenue at
the price p. This is achieved by serving fully all the hungry buyers at p and allocating as many
units as possible to the semi-hungry buyers. Finally, let REV0(v˜,B, p) denote the least possible
revenue at price p, which is attained by allocating zero units to each semi-hungry buyer, and
REV(v˜,B) denote the maximum possible revenue from the market M˜. For ease of notation,
we will write HpA(v) to denote the set HpA(v)(v) of hungry buyers at the price pA(v) computed
by A on input v: (and similarly for the sets SpA(v)(v) and IpA(v)(v)).
Let A be any mechanism that approximates the optimal revenue within a factor of β. We
consider two cases for the price pA(s):
Case 1. pA(s) = pA(v). A deviating buyer can find a strictly improving deviation if and only
if it can strictly lower the price. Since the price reached is equal to the price output on the
true valuations, it follows that no deviation has taken place. Then v is the Nash equilibrium to
which the dynamic converges and there is no loss in revenue.
Case 2. pA(s) < pA(v). The proof of Theorem 3.1 implies that in the Nash equilibrium reached
from the truth-telling profile, each buyer receives at least as many units as they did on the true
input v, except possibly the last deviator. Let ` be the last deviator in the best response path
from v to s.
Consider the reduced market M′ = (v−`,B−`,m), which is obtained from the marketM by
removing buyer `. Let p−`min be the minimum envy-free price inM′. Our goal is to lower bound
the revenue attained by A in the Nash equilibrium8, for which it will be sufficient to provide a
lower bound on REV0(s,B) since
REVA(s,B, pA(s)) ≥ REV0(s,B, pA(s)).
First, we claim that pA(s) ≥ p−`min, or equivalently, that pA(s) is an envy-free price for the
market M′. This follows from the following fact established by Theorem 3.1:
During the best response process, the price always decreases and at any point in
time, the only buyer that appears semi-hungry from the set IpA(v) (i.e. the set of
interested buyers at v), is the last deviator.
In our case, the last deviator is buyer `. Then for each buyer i ∈ IpA(v) \ {`}, we have that
si > pA(s), while for buyer ` we have s` ≥ pA(s). This implies that
REV0(s,B, pA(s)) = REV0(v−`,B−`, pA(s)).
Thus, it suffices to bound the minimum revenue attainable at the price pA(s), that is,
REV0(v−`,B−`, pA(s)).
Next, note that since pA(s) ∈ [p−`min, pA(v)), we can obtain that
REV0(v−`,B−`, pA(s)) ≥ (1/2)REV(v−`,B−`, pA(v)).
8Note that the revenue objective is not a function of the real values and therefore it can be measured by
simply the reports and the corresponding prices.
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For ease of exposition, let αi = Bi/pA(s) and α
∗
i = Bi/pA(v), ∀i ∈ N . Denote by L the set
of buyers with valuations at least pA(v) in the market M′ = (v−`,B−`,m) (i.e. buyers j with
vj ≥ pA(v)) that can afford at least one unit at pA(v); note that the set of buyers that get
allocated any items at pA(s) is a superset of L. Additionally, since pA(v) > pA(s), the set L
does not contain any buyers that are semi-hungry at pA(s) on M′. Moreover, the revenue at
pA(v) is bounded by the revenue attained at the (possibly infeasible) allocation where all the
buyers in L get the maximum number of units in their demand. These observations give the
next inequalities:
REV0(v−`,B−`, pA(s)) ≥
∑
i∈L
bαic · pA(s) and REV(v−`,B−`, pA(v)) ≤
∑
i∈L
bα∗i c · pA(v).
Then the revenue loss, denoted by
r =
REV0(v−`,B−`, pA(s))
REV(v−`,B−`, pA(v)) ,
can be bounded as follows:
r ≥
∑
i∈L bαic · pA(s)∑
i∈L bα∗i c · pA(v)
≥
∑
i∈L bαic · pA(s)∑
i∈L α
∗
i · pA(v)
=
∑
i∈L bαic · pA(s)∑
i∈LBi
=
∑
i∈L bαic∑
i∈L αi
≥
∑
i∈L bαic∑
i∈L 2 bαic
=
1
2
,
where we used the fact that the for any buyer i ∈ L, bαic ≥ 1, and so αi ≤ bαic+ 1 ≤ 2 bαic,
since by construction, all buyers in L can afford at least one unit at pA(v) and therefore at pA(s).
Note that in case the set L is empty, then Mechanism A extracts zero revenue at the truth-
telling profile and the theorem follows trivially. Finally, observe that REV(v−`,B−`, pA(v)) ≥
REV(v,B, pA(v)) − B`. This inequality holds because pA(v) is an envy-free price on input
M′ = (v−`,B−`,m) and outputting this price results in a loss of revenue of at most the budget
of the removed buyer. Since Mechanism A outputs price pA(v) on (v,B) and since it is a
β-approximation mechanism for the revenue objective, it also holds that REV(v,B, pA(v)) ≥
REVA(v,B) ≥ β · REV(v,B).
Tying everything together we have:
REVA(s,B) ≥ REV0(s,B, pA(s)) = REV0(v−`,B−`, pA(s)) ≥ 1
2
· REV(v−`,B−`, pA(v))
≥ β
2
· REV(v,B)− B`
2
≥ 1
2
(β − α)REV(v,B),
where the last inequality follows from the budget share definition. This completes the proof.
Note that as β approaches 1 (that is, A approaches a revenue-optimal mechanism) and
α approaches 0 (that is the market becomes fully competitive), the revenue attained in the
equilibrium is at least half of the optimum.
As can be seen from the next construction, the budget share is necessary. If there is one
buyer with a budget share of 100%, then the revenue obtained as a result of this dynamic
can be arbitrarily worse compared to the truth-telling profile (even for a revenue maximizing
mechanism).
Theorem 3.8. There is a mechanism (even a revenue maximizing one) for Walrasian envy-free
pricing such that for all  > 0 9, the best response dynamic starting from the truthful profile
converges to a Nash equilibrium where the revenue is Ω(1/) times worse than the optimum on
some market.
9For the lower bound we fix the step size to 1 on the input and output grids.
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4 Equilibrium Set
In this section, we consider all the equilibria of mechanisms, not only those reachable by best-
response dynamics starting from the truth-telling profile. These states are fixed points of the
dynamic. We will see that for a wide class of natural mechanisms, most of the guarantees
carry over to all “reasonable” (i.e. non-overbidding) equilibria. “Overbidding” refers to the
behavior in which a buyer i, with true value vi, declares a bid (value) higher than its true
value per unit. Any overbidding strategy is weakly dominated by truth-telling and can be ruled
out using arguments about uncertainty, risk-aversion or trembling-hand considerations[LB10,
CKK+15]. For this reason, overbidding has been ruled out as “unnatural” in the literature (e.g.
see [FFGL13]) and the study of no-overbidding equilibria is common (see e.g. the incentive
properties of the second-price auction) [CKS08, LB10, CKK+15, BR11].10 The omitted proofs
of this section are in Appendix B.
4.1 Properties
Given a market, a mechanism must determine two things: the price and the allocation to the
semi-hungry buyers. The hungry buyers require a fixed number of units and the uninterested
buyers no units. In the absence of incentives, the choice of how to allocate the semi-hungry
buyers is not very important; any way of allocating the same number of units to them will
give the same welfare and revenue. Interestingly however, we will show that the equilibrium
behaviour of mechanisms is significantly affected by this choice and some choices result in better
welfare and revenue guarantees. This is something that a mechanism designer could find useful
when deciding the allocation rule for these buyers.
For the choice of prices, we will study mechanisms that follow a simple monotonicity prop-
erty, that we will refer to as price-monotonicity :
Definition 2 (Price-monotone). An mechanism A is price-monotone if for any two valuation
profiles v and v′ such that v′i ≤ vi for all buyers i ∈ N (with the other market parameters fixed),
it holds that pA(v
′) ≤ pA(v).
We have the following definitions regarding the manner in which a mechanism allocates units
to the semi-hungry buyers.
Definition 3 (Non-wasteful). An mechanism A is non-wasteful if it always allocates as many
units as possible to the semi-hungry buyers.11
Definition 4 (S-Greedy). An mechanism A is S-Greedy if for any market, after allocating the
hungry buyers, it fixes an ordering of the semi-hungry buyers and allocates as many units as
possible to each buyer i in the ordering until exhausting i’s budget or running out of units.
Note that the ordering selected by an S-greedy mechanism can be different for different
input profiles, even if the sets of semi-hungry buyers in the two inputs are the same.
Definition 5 (Supply-monotone). An mechanism A is said to be supply-monotone if keeping
the valuation of a buyer and the price unchanged, while increasing the supply, results in that
buyer receiving (weakly) more units.
10For a more detailed discussion on the no-overbidding assumption and why it is natural, the reader is referred
to [LB10].
11Equivalently, the mechanism gives each semi-hungry buyer the maximum element in its demand set or sells
all the units.
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In other words, for any budgets B and valuation profiles v = (vi,v−i) and v′ = (vi,v′−i), if A
computes the same price p on marketsM = (v,B,m) andM = (v′,B,m), and there are more
units available for buyer i in v′, then x′i ≥ xi, where x,x′ are the allocations made by A on M
and M′ respectively.
Supply-monotonicity is a property satisfied by many natural mechanisms. We have the impli-
cations:
S-greedy⇒ Non-wasteful⇒ Supply monotone.
Therefore, proving a result for the class of all supply-monotone mechanisms immediately implies
a result for all non-wasteful mechanisms (and hence all S-greedy mechanisms). We will use the
term monotone for a mechanism that satisfies the monotonicity properties in the prices and the
allocation to the semi-hungry buyers.
Definition 6 (Monotone). A (Walrasian) envy-free pricing mechanism is monotone if it’s both
price-monotone and supply-monotone.
4.2 Social Welfare and Revenue
In this subsection, we state our main theorems that bound the welfare loss and the revenue
approximation for any non-overbidding equilibrium of monotone mechanisms, which will then
give us corollaries for the classes of mechanisms discussed in the previous subsection. We will
actually prove quantified versions of the welfare and revenue guarantees, which are further
parametrized by the number of semi-hungry buyers that receive partial allocations.
More concretely, we will let UpA(v) ⊆ SpA(v) denote the set of semi-hungry buyers that
receive partial allocations by Mechanism A at price pA, i.e. for each i ∈ UpA(v) it holds that
xAi (v) ∈ (0,min{bBi/pc,m}). Also, let γA = maxv UpA(v) be the maximum possible number
of semi-hungry buyers with partial allocations over all possible inputs v, where the known
parameters (n,m and B) are fixed. Note that for an S-Greedy mechanism, it holds that γA ≤ 1.
4.2.1 Welfare guarantees
First, we state the theorem that extends the welfare guarantees to the set of all non-overbidding
equilibria.
Theorem 4.1 (Welfare in any non-overbidding Nash equilibrium). Let A be a monotone mech-
anism. Then in any pure Nash equilibrium of A where buyers do not overbid, the loss in social
welfare (compared to the truth-telling outcome of A) is at most γA · B∗, where γA is the maxi-
mum number of semi-hungry buyers that receive partial allocations by A and B∗ the maximum
budget.
Since supply-monotonicity implies several other properties, Theorem 4.1 has the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 2. Let A be a price-monotone, mechanism. Then in any pure Nash equilibrium of
A where buyers do not overbid, the loss in social welfare (compared to the truth-telling outcome
of A) is at most
- γA ·B∗, if Mechanism A is non-wasteful, where B∗ is the maximum budget,
- maxi∈NBi, if Mechanism A is S-Greedy.
where γA is the maximum number of buyers that receive partial allocations by A.
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Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 4.1, the fact that supply-monotonicity is implied by
these two properties and the observation that for any S-Greedy mechanism A, it holds that
γA ≤ 1.
Theorem 4.1 and its corollary bound the welfare loss for a large class of mechanisms, com-
pared to the outcome of the mechanism when buyers are truth-telling. In particular, the class of
price-monotone mechanisms that are S-greedy contains welfare-maximizing mechanisms. As we
show in the following theorem, if we restrict our attention to welfare-maximizing mechanisms,
we can obtain the same guarantee without any assumption on the allocation of units to the
semi-hungry buyers.
Theorem 4.2. Let A be a price-monotone welfare-maximizing mechanism. Then in any pure
Nash equilibrium of A where buyers do not overbid, the loss in social welfare (compared to the
truth-telling outcome) is at most the maximum budget.
4.2.2 Revenue Guarantees
Next, we will prove that the revenue guarantee of Theorem 3.7 extends to all reasonable equi-
libria of the natural class of price-monotone mechanisms for different allocation rules for the
semi-hungry buyers. Again, the guarantees will depend on the nature of this allocation rule.
Theorem 4.3 (Revenue in any non-overbidding Nash equilibrium). Let A be a monotone mech-
anism that approximates the optimal revenue within a factor of β (with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1). Then in
every non-overbidding Nash equilibrium of A, the revenue is a (β − γA · α) /2 approximation of
the optimal revenue for that instance, where α is the budget share of the market and γA is the
maximum number of buyers that receive partial allocations by A.
Again, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Let A be a price-monotone mechanism which approximates the optimal revenue
within a factor of β on every instance. Then in every non-overbidding Nash equilibrium of A,
the revenue approximation achieved is
- (β − γA · α) /2, if A is non-wasteful,
- (β − α) /2, if A is S-Greedy,
where α is the budget share of the market and γA is the maximum number of semi-hungry buyers
receiving partial allocations by A.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem 4.3, together with the fact that supply-monotonicity
is implied by those two properties and that for any S-Greedy mechanism A, it holds that
γA ≤ 1.
5 The All-or-Nothing mechanism
In this section we study a mechanism with good guarantees for revenue and welfare that was
suggested in [BFRMZ17], which was shown to be truthful, i.e. for any agent i, truth-telling
is always a best-response, for any strategy profile s−i of the remaining buyers.12 The omitted
proofs of this section can be found in Appendix C.
12In game-theoretic terms, this is the same as saying that truth-telling is a dominant strategy equilibrium.
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Definition 7 (Mechanism All-or-Nothing:). Given as input the valuations of the buyers,
let p be the minimum envy-free price and x the allocation obtained as follows:
- For every hungry buyer i, set xi to its demand.
- For every buyer i with vi < p, set xi = 0.
- For every semi-hungry buyer i, set xi = bBi/pc if possible, otherwise set xi = 0 taking
the semi-hungry buyers in lexicographic order.
The All-or-Nothing mechanism has several desirable properties.
Theorem 5.1 ([BFRMZ17]). The All-Or-Nothing mechanism is truthful and
• has welfare is at least w∗ − B∗, where w∗ is the optimal welfare and B∗ is the maximum
budget.
• it approximates the optimal revenue within a (multiplicative) factor of at least min {1/2, 1− α},
where α is the budget share of the market.
The mechanism is optimal for both the revenue and welfare objectives when the market is even
mildly competitive13 and its approximation for welfare converges to 1 as the market becomes
fully competitive.
However, nothing is known about the equilibrium set of the mechanism, or its convergence
properties when instantiated from any arbitrary strategy profile. To this end, first we provide
the following theorem, with a proof in Appendix C.
Theorem 5.2. For n = 2 buyers, the best response dynamic of the All-or-Nothing mecha-
nism converges to a Nash equilibrium from any initial strategy profile.
We conjecture the mechanism converges for any number of buyers.
Open 1. Does the best response dynamic of the All-or-Nothing mechanism converge from
any initial profile for any number of buyers?
Finally, taking advantage of our theorems for general classes of mechanisms developed in
the previous sections, we provide the following stronger guarantee:
Theorem 5.3. For n = 2 buyers, the best-response dynamic starting from any profile of the
All-Or-Nothing mechanism converges to a pure Nash equilibrium. Moreover, in every non-
overbidding equilibrium of All-Or-Nothing, for any number of buyers,
- has welfare is at least w∗ − B∗, where w∗ is the optimal welfare and B∗ is the maximum
budget.
- the revenue is approximated within a (multiplicative) factor of at least min {0.25 , (1− α)/2}−
α/2 where α is the budget share of the market.
In particular, in competitive markets (where α approaches 0), mechanism All-Or-Nothing
approximates the optimal revenue within a factor of 4 in any non-overbidding equilibrium.
The proof of the welfare and revenue guarantees of Theorem 5.3 follow from the remark above,
together with Theorem 5.1, Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.3, since the All-Or-Nothing mech-
anism is monotonic and the number of semi-hungry buyers with partial allocations is at most
1, i.e. γ ≤ 1.
13In [BFRMZ17], the notion of market competition is actually slightly different from ours, but simple cal-
culations can show that it is upper bounded by the budget share α; we state the theorem in terms of α for
consistency.
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Figure 2: The convergence properties of the All-Or-Nothing mechanism when the dynamic
starts from 100 different arbitrary profiles, for n = 25,m = 20. The budgets are drawn uniformly
at random from [1, 50] (right) and [1, 125] (left). The differently coloured lines indicate different
starting profiles s(0).
6 Discussion
It would be interesting to understand more precisely the best response process initiated from
arbitrary states (in particular, whether the All-or-Nothing mechanism converges for any
number of buyers) and more general classes of valuations.
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A Dynamics
Theorem A.1 (Necessary allocation loss). [3.2 in main text] There exist markets where the
best response dynamic of a mechanism converges to an allocation where some buyer loses units
compared to the truth-telling outcome.
Proof. Let A be the mechanism which sets the price equal to the lowest valuation that is envy-
free, breaking ties in a fixed way (the same for all valuations) to decide the order in which the
semi-hungry buyers are allocated. Note that there is always such an envy-free price, since it is
always possible to set it to the highest valuation, at which all the buyers are either semi-hungry
or not interested. Given a market M = (v,B,m), let pA(v) denote the price and xAi (v) the
allocation of buyer i computed by A for the market M.
Take a market with n = 3 buyers—Alice, Bob, and Carol—and m = 3 items, where the
valuations are vAlice = 1.1, vBob = 1.1, and vCarol = 1, while the budgets areBAlice = BBob = 2.2
and BCarol = 1. Let the tie-breaking order be 1, 3, 2 and the grid step 0.001. At the truth-telling
outcome, the price set by Mechanism A is pA(v) = vBob = 1.1, where Alice gets x
A
Alice(v) = 2
units, Bob gets xABob(v) = 1 units, and Carol gets x
A
Carol(v) = 0 units. This is the lowest
envy-free price equal to some valuation since setting the price to vCarol = 1 would result in both
Alice and Bob having a demand of two, while only three units are available. Alice’s utility is
uAlice(v, pA(v)) = x
A
Alice(v) · vAlice − pA(v) · xAAlice(v) = 2 · 1.1− 1.1 · 2 = 0.
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We claim that Alice has a best response at v′Alice = 1. Let v
′ = (v′Alice, vBob, vCarol). The
price output by A at v′ is pA(v′) = 1. Since Bob appears hungry, while Alice and Carol are semi-
hungry at pA(v
′) with tie-breaking order 1, 3, 2, the allocation is xAAlice(v
′) = 1, xABob(v
′) = 2
and xACarol(v
′) = 0, which gives Alice a utility of
uAlice(v
′, pA(v′)) = xAAlice(v
′)·vAlice−pA(v′)·xAAlice(v′) = 1·1.1−1·1 = 0.1 > uAlice(v, pA(v)) = 0.
For any input v′′Alice ∈ (1, 1.1), the price would be set to v′′Alice, at which Alice would still
get only one unit (since Bob is hungry in this range), but at a higher price compared to v′Alice.
At any input v′′Alice < 1, the price would be set to v
′′
Alice but Alice would get no units since the
demands of the hungry buyers, Bob and Carol, will be satisfied first. It follows that v′Alice is a
best response for Alice given the state v.
We show that v′ is a Nash equilibrium. Note that
uBob(v
′, pA(v′)) = vBob · xABob(v′)− pA(v′) · xABob(v′) = 1.1 · 2− 1 · 2 = 0.2.
For any alternative input v′′Bob ∈ (1, 1.1) of Bob, the price and allocation of Bob would
remain fixed. The input v′′Bob = 1 also does not change the price, and in fact gives Bob zero
units, since now all the buyers appear semi-hungry and the order of serving them is Alice, Carol,
Bob. Finally, any v′′Bob < 1 results in price equal to v
′′
Bob < 1, at which Alice and Carol are
hungry, thus giving Bob zero units; this cannot be an improvement. We argue that Carol also
has no improving deviation. If Carol reports v′′Carol < 1, the price would be decreased to p
′′ = v′′3 ;
however, Alice and Bob appear hungry at this price, and would get all the units, leaving Carol
with zero units. Thus v′ is a Nash equilibrium in which Alice loses a unit compared to the
truth-telling outcome, which completes the proof.
Theorem A.2 (Convergence time of consistent mechanisms). [3.4 in main text] Let A be
any consistent mechanism. The best response dynamic starting from the truth-telling profile
converges to a pure Nash equilibrium of A in at most n steps.
Proof. Since convergence is established by Theorem 3.1, we must show here that the convergence
time is at most n rounds. We will argue that each deviating buyer best-responds only once
during the dynamic. Consider a market M = (v,B,m). For any valuation profile v˜, let
pA(v˜) denote the price and x
A
i (v˜) the allocation of buyer i computed by A given as input the
market M′ = (v˜,B,m) (i.e. the price output by the mechanism on valuations v˜). Assume by
contradiction that this is not true, and consider any buyer i and two different best responses of
the buyer:
• the first deviation is from the truth-telling strategy vi to a different value v′i, when the
strategies of the other buyers are s−i.
• the second deviation is from v′i to a value v′′i , when the other buyers’ strategies are s′−i.
By the proof of Theorem 3.1, we know that the price decreases in each step of the best-response
process, therefore we can assume that
pA(vi, s−i) > pA(v′i, s−i) > pA(v
′
i, s
′
−i) > pA(v
′′
i , s
′
−i).
Consider the number of units allocated to buyer i at those prices. First, it holds that xAi (v
′
i, s
′
−i) ≥
xAi (v
′
i, s−i), since buyer i appears to be hungry at price pA(v
′
i, s
′
−i) and pA(v
′
i, s
′
−i) < pA(v
′
i, s−i),
so the buyer can not receive fewer units. Since the buyer is best-responding from v′i to v
′′
i , we
have
(vi − pA(v′′i , s′−i)) · xAi (v′′i , s′−i) > (vi − pA(v′i, s′−i)) · xAi (v′i, s′−i) > (vi − pA(v′i, s−i)) · xAi (v′i, s−i),
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where the last inequality holds since xAi (v
′
i, s
′
−i) ≥ xAi (v′i, s−i) and pA(v′i, s−i) > pA(v′i, s′−i).
Now consider the input profile (v′′i , s−i) and notice that the sets of hungry and semi-hungry
buyers at price pA(v
′′
i , s
′
−i) are the same as those on profile (v
′′
i , s
′
−i); this is implied by the
properties of the best-response sequence of Theorem 3.1. Therefore, by consistency, it is the
case that pA(v
′′
i , s−i) = pA(v
′′
i , s
′
−i) and x
A
i (v
′′
i , s−i) = x
A
i (v
′′
i , s
′
−i), which by the formula above
means that
(vi − pA(v′′i , s′−i)) · xAi (v′′i , s′−i) > (vi − pA(v′i, s−i)) · xAi (v′i, s−i).
This contradicts the fact that v′i was a best response on the input profile (vi, s−i) in the
first place. Therefore, each buyer best-responds at most once during the dynamic and the
convergence is guaranteed within n steps.
Theorem A.3. [3.8 in main text] There is a mechanism (even a revenue maximizing one) for
Walrasian envy-free pricing such that for all  > 0 14, the best response dynamic starting from
the truthful profile converges to a Nash equilibrium where the revenue is Ω(1/) times worse
than the optimum on some market.
Proof. Let A be a revenue optimal mechanism, such that for each input, if given a choice, it
minimizes the number of allocated buyers (given that the revenue has been maximized) and
sets the highest possible envy-free price with these properties. Moreover, let A break ties
lexicographically when allocating to semi-hungry buyers, such that each buyer is allocated as
many units it can afford before allocating the next buyer. Let both the input and output grids
have step size 1.
Given  > 0, consider a market with n = 2 buyers, m = 1 units, valuations v1 = d1/e,
v2 = 1, and budgets B1 = B2 = d1/e. On this input, A sets the price to p = d1/e, allocating
x1 = 1 units to buyer 1 and x2 = 0 units to buyer 2. The revenue obtained this way is
REV(v1, v2) = d1/e, thus exhausting the budget of buyer 1. This is the optimal revenue since
there is only one unit and d1/e is the maximum price any buyer is willing to pay for it.
Buyer 1 can respond from the truthful state with v′1 = 1. Then A sets the price to p′ = 1,
allocating x′1 = 1 units to buyer 1 and x′2 = 0 units to buyer 2. This clearly improves buyer
1’s utility, since he gets the same number of units at a lower price. The revenue at this price
is REV(v′1, v2) = 1. We argue that no valuation v′′1 < 1 can improve buyer 1’s utility, since at
any such profile (v′′1 , v2) the mechanism can still set p′ = 1 and sell the unit to buyer 2 instead,
which would give buyer 1 a utility of zero. Moreover, at any v′1 ∈ (1, v1), buyer 1 would still get
the item for a price weakly higher than 1, which would result in utility at most that obtained
on input (v′′1 , v2). Thus the report v′′1 is a best response for buyer 1.
Moreover, the state (v′1, v2) is a Nash equilibrium. The valuation v′1 is a best response for
buyer 1, while if buyer 2 reported a lower value than 1, the price would remain the same without
improving 2’s allocation. We have
REV(v1, v2)
REV(v′1, v2)
=
⌈
1

⌉
This completes the proof.
B Equilibrium Set
We start with the following lemma, which will be used throughout the proofs. The lemma
essentially states that for monotone mechanisms, if a buyer received any units under truth-
telling, it must also receive some units at the equilibrium s.
14For the lower bound we fix the step size to 1 on the input and output grids.
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Lemma 1. Let A be a monotone mechanism and v the true valuations of some market. Then
in any non-overbidding pure Nash equilibrium s of A, there does not exist a buyer i such that:
- the buyer receives non-zero units under the truth-telling profile,
- the buyer receives zero units in the equilibrium allocation.
Proof. Let pA(v˜) denote the price chosen by Mechanism A and x
A
i (v˜) denote the number of
units allocated to buyer i on input market (v˜,B,m).
Assume by contradiction that there exists a buyer i such that xAi (v) > 0 and x
A
i (s) = 0
and consider the strategy vi of the buyer where it deviates to truth-telling. By the price-
monotonicity of A, it holds that pA(s) ≤ pA(vi, s−i) ≤ pA(v), since sj ≤ vj for all j ∈ N , by the
fact that profile s is a no-overbidding equilibrium. We consider two cases.
Case 1: Either it holds that pA(vi, s−i) < pA(v) or buyer i was hungry on the truth-telling
profile v. In that case, the buyer receives a strictly positive allocation xAi (vi, s−i) at price
pA(vi, s−i), obtaining positive utility and contradicting the fact that s is a pure Nash equilib-
rium.
Case 2: It holds that pA(vi, s−i) = pA(v) and buyer i is semi-hungry on the truth-telling
profile v. In that case, the equilibrium condition is violated unless the buyer receives exactly
0 units on (vi, s−i) at price pA(vi, s−i). However, by the fact that buyers do not overbid, it
holds that sj ≤ vj for all j ∈ N and therefore, it also holds that IpA(vi, s−i) ⊆ IpA(v) and
HpA(vi, s−i) ⊆ HpA(v). In other words, there is more available supply for the semi-hungry
buyers on (vi, s−i) compared to v, and Mechanism A outputs the same price on both inputs.
By supply monotonicity, since xAi (v) > 0 holds, it also holds that x
A
i (vi, s−i) > 0 and vi is a
beneficial deviation on profile s contradicting the fact that s is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Using Lemma 1, we will prove our social welfare and revenue guarantees for the set of all non-
overbidding equilibria of mechanisms which are price-monotone under different assumptions
for the allocations of semi-hungry buyers. In short, if the mechanism is S-Greedy, then the
welfare and revenue guarantees of Theorem 3.6 and Theorem 3.7 extend to the case of all
non-overbidding equilibria. If A is non-wasteful (but not necessarily S-Greedy), then we prove
quantified versions of the welfare and revenue guarantees, which are further parametrized by
the number of semi-hungry buyers that receive partial allocations.
Recall from the main text that UpA(v) ⊆ SpA(v) denotes the set of semi-hungry buyers
that receive partial allocations by Mechanism A at price pA, i.e. for each i ∈ UpA(v) it holds
that xAi (v) ∈ (0,min{bBi/pc,m}). Also, γA = maxv UpA(v) is the maximum possible number
of semi-hungry buyers with partial allocations over all possible inputs v, where the known
parameters (n,m and B) are fixed. Note that for an S-Greedy mechanism, it holds that γA ≤ 1.
Theorem B.1 (Welfare in any non-overbidding Nash equilibrium). [4.1 in main text] Let A be
a monotone mechanism. Then in any pure Nash equilibrium of A where buyers do not overbid,
the loss in social welfare (compared to the truth-telling outcome of A) is at most γA ·B∗, where
γA is the maximum number of semi-hungry buyers that receive partial allocations by A and B
∗
the maximum budget.
Proof. Similarly to before, for a fixed vector of budgets B and number of units m, let pA(v˜)
denote the price and xAi (v˜) denote the allocation buyer i on input M = (v˜,B,m).
Let s be a non-overbidding equilibrium of A, i.e. it holds that sj ≤ vj for all j ∈ N .
Since A is price-monotone, this implies that pA(s) ≤ pA(v). Additionally, since A is is also
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supply-monotone, by Lemma 1, there do not exist any buyers that receive positive allocations
on the truth-telling profile v and zero allocations in the equilibrium s. Therefore, the only loss
in welfare is due to each buyer i ∈ UpA(s) that receives xAi (s) units on s and xAi (v) units on v,
with 0 < xAi (s) < x
A
i (v). Since pA(s) ≤ pA(v), these buyers are semi-hungry at s, as otherwise
they could not receive fewer units at a price which is not larger than before.
Consider any such buyer i ∈ UpA(s) and consider the deviation vi to truth-telling, and the
resulting profile (vi, s−i). We will consider two cases:
Case 1: Buyer i is hungry on v under pA(v). Since sj ≤ vj for all j ∈ N and Mechanism A
is monotone, it also holds that pA(vi, s−i) ≤ pA(v) and therefore buyer i is hungry on (vi, s−i)
at price pA(vi, s−i) as well. This means buyer i receives at least xAi (v) units at pA(vi, s−i) on
profile (vi, s−i).
Case 2: Buyer i is semi-hungry on v under pA(v). Since sj ≤ vj for all j ∈ N and Mechanism
A is price-monotone, it also holds that pA(vi, s−i) ≤ pA(v) and therefore buyer i is either
hungry or semi-hungry on (vi, s−i) at price pA(vi, s−i). If it is hungry, again it must receive
at least xAi (v) units at pA(vi, s−i) on profile (vi, s−i). If it is semi-hungry, this means that
pA(vi, s−i) = pA(v) and therefore its demand set on profiles (vi, s−i) and v is the same. By the
fact that there is no overbidding, it holds that HpA(vi, s−i) ⊆ HpA(v) and IpA(vi, s−i) ⊆ IpA(v),
which means that there is more available supply for buyer i on input (vi, s−i). Since Mechanism
A is supply-monotone, it allocates xAi (v) to buyer i on profile (vi, s−i).
From the two cases above, we conclude that xAi (vi, s−i) ≥ xAi (v) for the deviating buyer. By
the equilibrium condition for profile s and for the deviation vi of buyer i, we have:
vi · xAi (s)− pA(s) · xAi (s) ≥ vi · xAi (vi, s−i)− pA(vi, s−i) · xAi (vi, s−i)
≥ vi · xAi (v)− pA(vi, s−i) · xAi (v) ≥ vi · xAi (v)− pA(v) · xAi (v),
where the second inequality holds because vi ≥ pA((vi, s−i)) and xAi (vi, s−i) ≥ xAi (v) and the last
inequality holds because and pA(vi, s−i) ≤ pA(v), as explained earlier. The loss in welfare by this
buyer is then bounded by vi(x
A
i (v)−xAi (s)) ≤ pA(v)·xAi (v)−pA(s)·xAi (s) ≤ pA(v)·xAi (v) ≤ Bi,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of the demand, since a buyer can never
receive an allocation at a price that would exceed its budget. The total loss in welfare is then
bounded by
∑
i∈UpA (s)Bi ≤ γA ·maxi∈S Bi ≤ γA ·maxi∈N Bi and the theorem follows.
Theorem B.2. [4.2 in main text] Let A be a price-monotone welfare-maximizing mechanism.
Then in any pure Nash equilibrium of A where buyers do not overbid, the loss in social welfare
(compared to the truth-telling outcome) is at most the maximum budget.
Proof. The first part of the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 4.1. By observing that
welfare-maximizing mechanisms are non-wasteful and therefore supply-monotone, using exactly
the same arguments as those in the first paragraph of the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can establish
that the only loss in welfare is only due to each semi-hungry buyer i ∈ UpA(s) on s, that receives
xAi (s) units on s and x
A
i (v) units on v, with 0 < x
A
i (s) < x
A
i (v).
Also, from the last paragraph of the proof of Theorem 4.1, we know that the loss in welfare
is bounded by maxi∈N Bi as long as |UpA(s)| ≤ 1. What remains is to prove is that UpA(s) is a
singleton, i.e. that it can not be the case that there exist at least two buyers i, j that appear
semi-hungry at price pA(s) such that both 0 < x
A
i (s) < x
A
i (v) and 0 < x
A
j (s) < x
A
j (v) hold.
Assume by contradiction |UpA(s)| > 1 and consider the deviation of a buyer i ∈ UpA(s),
where the buyer reports s′i = si + , where si +  is the next grid point on the output domain.
We consider three cases for the price pA(s
′
i, s−i) on profile (s
′
i, s−i):
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Case 1: pA(s
′
i, s−i) < s
′
i. In this case, buyer i appears hungry on (s
′
i, s−i) and must receive
min{bBi/pA(s′i, s−i)c,m} ≥ xAi (v) units at this price. Its difference in utility from the deviation
is
du ≥ vi
(
xAi (v)− pA(s′i, s−i)
)− vi(xAi (s)− ps)
= vi
(
xAi (v)− xAi (s) + pA(s′i, s−i)− ps
)
= vi
(
xAi (v)− xAi (s) + pA(s′i, s−i)− si
)
,
where du = vi
(
xAi (s
′
i, s−i)− pA(s′i, s−i)
)− vi (xAi (s)− ps) and where the last equation holds by
the fact that buyer i appears semi-hungry at s and therefore si = pA(s). By the assumption that
xAi (s) < x
A
i (v), it holds that x
A
i (s) ≤ xAi (v) + 1, since allocations are integers. Additionally,
since  < 1, it holds that pA(s
′
i, s−i) − si < 1 and therefore the difference in utility from the
devation s′i is strictly positive, violating the fact that s is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Case 2: pA(s
′
i, s−i) = s
′
i. In this case, buyer i appears semi-hungry on (s
′
i, s−i) and receives
0 ≤ xAi (s′i, s−i) ≤ min{bBi/pA(s′i, s−i)c,m} units. Note however that there is enough supply
at price pA(s
′
i, s−i) to allocate at least x
A
i (s) + 1 units to buyer i. This is because (i) buyer i
can afford xAi (v) items at price pA(v) and therefore also at price pA(s
′
i, s−i) ≤ pA(v) and (ii)
we can add the additional xAj (s) units to buyer i’s allocation since buyer j is not interested at
price pA(s
′
i, s−i) and since by assumption, x
A
j (s) > 0. Since welfare-maximizing mechanisms are
non-wasteful, buyer i receives at least xAi (s) + 1 units on (s
′
i, s−i) and a very similar argument
to the previous case shows that this violates the equilibrium condition.
Case 3: pA(s
′
i, s−i) > s
′
i. This case is not possible as it would violate the welfare-maximizing
nature of Mechanism A; by setting the price to s′i and allocating as much as possible to buyer
i, one would obtain a higher welfare without violating envy-freeness. In each case, we obtain
a contradiction, which implies that there can be at most one buyer that appears semi-hungry
at price pA(s) on s that receives a smaller allocation than its allocation under the truth-telling
profile, i.e. that |UpA(s)| ≤ 1.
Theorem B.3 (Revenue in any non-overbidding Nash equilibrium). [4.3 in main text] Let A
be a monotone mechanism that approximates the optimal revenue within a factor of β (with 0 ≤
β ≤ 1). Then in every non-overbidding Nash equilibrium of A, the revenue is a (β − γA · α) /2
approximation of the optimal revenue for that instance, where α is the budget share of the market
and γA is the maximum number of buyers that receive partial allocations by A.
Proof. Several arguments will differ from the proof of Theorem 3.7, since we are now considering
all non-overbidding equilibria and not just those that can be reached from truth-telling by best-
responding. Similarly to before, for a fixed vector of budgets B and number of units m, let
pA(v˜) denote the price and x
A
i (v˜) denote the allocation buyer i on input M = (v˜,B,m).
Let s be a pure Nash equilibrium of Mechanism A. First, notice that by the fact that buyers
do not overbid, it holds that si ≤ vi for all i ∈ N , which in turns implies that pA(s) ≤ pA(v),
by the price-monotonicity of Mechanism A. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.7, we consider
two cases.
Case 1: pA(s) = pA(v). Consider any buyer i ∈ HpA(v) that receives 0 ≤ xAi (s) < xAi (v) units
on s, and consider its deviation from s to truth-telling vi, with the resulting profile (vi, s−i). By
the price-monotonicity of Mechanism A, it holds that pA(s) ≤ pA(vi, s−i) ≤ pA(v), which means
that pA(vi, s−i) = pA(s). However on (vi, s−i), buyer i now appears hungry at the same price
pA(s) and receives x
A
i (v) units, violating the fact that s is a pure Nash equilibrium. Therefore,
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every buyer i ∈ HpA(v) receives xAi (s) units on s and there is no loss in revenue.
Case 2. pA(s) < pA(v). By Lemma 1, it holds that there do not exist buyers that receive
non-zero allocations on the truth-telling profile v and zero allocations on the equilibrium profile
s. Therefore, on s, each buyer receives at least as many units as they did on the true input v,
except possibly the set UpA(s) containing the semi-hungry buyers j that receive allocations in
(0,min{bBj/pA(s)c,m}) (that is, each buyer j in the set UpA(s), receives a number of units yj
such that 0 < yj < min {bBj/pA(s)c,m}).
Again, we consider the reduced market M′ = (v−U ,B−U ,m), which is obtained by the original
market M = (v,B,m) by removing all buyers in UpA(s). Let p−Umin denote the minimum envy-
free price in M′. We claim that pA(s) ≥ p−Umin, i.e. pA(s) is an envy-free price of the reduced
market. To see this, we need to establish that at price pA(s),
1. IpA(s)(s) ⊆ IpA(s)(v), i.e. there are no buyers that are uninterested at price pA(s) on v
and appear interested on s.
2. every buyer i ∈ HpA(v)\UpA(s) (i.e. who is hungry at pA(v)) receives xAi (v) units on s at
price pA(s).
The first property follows directly by the fact that buyers are not overbidding. For the second
property, note that for every buyer i ∈ HpA(v)\UpA(s) that is hungry on v and which also
appears to be hungry at s, the property is trivially satisfied by the definition of envy-free
pricing. Also, if buyer i appears to be semi-hungry at s, since i /∈ UpA(s), it receives either
xAi (v) units (i.e. as many units as it can afford at this price) or 0 units at pA(s). By Lemma 1,
the latter is not possible, since i ∈ HpA(v), and therefore it follows that xAi (s) = xAi (v). This
establishes the second property which in turn implies that pA(s) ≥ p−Umin, i.e. that pA(s) is an
envy-free price of the reduced market M′.
Recall the definitions of the first paragraph in the proof of Theorem 3.7. By Property (2)
above, it follows that REVA(s,B, pA(s)) = REV0(v−U ,B−U , pA(s)) and therefore it suffices to
lower bound REV0(v−U ,B−U , pA(s)), i.e. the minimum possible revenue attainable at price
pA(s). In order to establish that
REV0(v−U ,B−U , pA(s)) ≥ (1/2)REV(v−U ,B−U , pA(v)),
the arguments are identical to those used in the proof of Theorem 3.7 (with the only notational
difference that the index −` is now replaced by −U).
Additionally, we have that
REV(v−U ,B−U , pA(v)) ≥ REV(v,B, pA(v))−
∑
i∈UpA (s)
xAi (v) · pA(v),
because by simply choosing price pA(v) on M′ = (v−U ,B−U ,m) (which is an envy-free price),
we lose at most the contribution to the revenue of the buyers in UpA(s). Using a very similar
calculation as in the proof of Theorem 3.7, we obtain that
REVA(s,B) ≥ 1
2
· REV(v−U ,B−U , pA(v))
≥ β
2
· REV(v,B)−
∑
i∈UpA (s)Bi
2
≥ 1
2
(β − γA · α)REV(v,B)
where the last inequality follows from the definition of the budget share. This completes the
argument.
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C The All-or-Nothing mechanism
To give some intuition, we start with a few simple examples of equilibria of All-Or-Nothing
which are not the dominant-strategy, truth-telling equilibria. Note that the set of equilibria the
we present contain both overbidding and non-overbidding equilibria and equilibria where the
price is either higher, lower or equal to the price under truth-telling.
Example 3. Consider the following profile of true valuations with m = 10 units and n = 5
buyers such that for each buyer i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, the buyer has a valuation-budget pair (vi, Bi)
given by the following:
(v1, B1) = (2, 2), (v2, B2) = (2, 2), (v3, B3) = (1, 6), (v4, B4) = (0.5, 1), (v5, B5) = (0.5, 2)
Consider the following profiles, which are easily verifable to be pure Nash equilibria:
1. All buyers are truth-telling. In that case, the price is p = 1, buyers 1 and 2 receive 2 units
each and all other buyers receive 0 units. This is the dominant-strategy equilibrium.
2. v′1 = 3, v′5 = 0.4 and v′i = vi for i ∈ {2, 3, 4}. The price is again p = 1, buyers 1 and 2
receive 2 units each and all other buyers receive 0 units.
3. v′4 = v′5 = 0.1, v′i = vi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The price is again p = 1, buyers 1 and 2 receive 2
units each and all other buyers receive 0 units.
4. v′3 = 0.5, v′i = vi for i ∈ {1, 2, 4, 5}. The price is now p = 0.5, buyers 1 and 2 receive 4
units each, buyer 4 receives the remaining 2 units and buyers 3 and 4 receive 0 units.
We will show that for n = 2 buyers, the best response dynamic of this mechanism converges
no matter what the starting profile is.
Theorem C.1. [5.2 in main text] For n = 2 buyers, the best response dynamic of the All-or-
Nothing mechanism converges to a Nash equilibrium from any initial strategy profile.
In order to prove this theorem we develop first a series of lemmas. We start with a simple
lemma with some immediate properties of the mechanism.
Lemma 2. The following facts hold about the All-Or-Nothing mechanism:
1. All-Or-Nothing is monotonic.
2. Given a price p, All-Or-Nothing allocates to each buyer either all or nothing at this
price, but never anything in between.
3. In All-Or-Nothing, a buyer will never best-repond twice in a row.
Proof. We argue each of the items (1)-(3) above individually:
1. First, the mechanism is price-monotonic as it always outputs the minimum envy-free
price. If a buyer reports a lower value, the minimum envy-free price can not increase
and similarly, if a buyer increases its reported value, the minimum envy-free price can
not decrease. For supply-monotonicity, note that since the mechanism allocates buyers to
the semi-hungry buyers in lexicographic order, it is not possible for a buyer that receives
fewer units at the same price, when the number of interested buyers is decreased. From
these two properties, we obtain that All-Or-Nothing is monotonic.
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2. This is by the definition of the mechanism. If a buyer is hungry, it receives all the units
in its demand, i.e. all. If a buyer is semi-hungry, it either receives all possible units that
it can afford, i.e. all or no units at all, i.e. nothing.
3. Assume by contradiction that some agent could best-respond twice in a row from profile
s1 to s2 and then to s3. By the definition of All-Or-Nothing, the outcome of the
mechanism would be the same as the one obtained if the agent had best-responded from
s1 to s3, contradicting the fact that the move from s1 to s2 was a best-response.
The following definition will be useful.
Definition 8 (Type −, 0,+). Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) be any strategy profile. Then a buyer i has
type:
• +: if its utility in s is positive.
• 0: if its utility in s is 0.
• −: if its utility in s is negative.
We will say that an agent is a “type h” agent, for h ∈ {−, 0,+}. Furthermore, given a profile
s = (s1, . . . , sn) we will use a vector (h1, . . . , hn) to denote the buyers’ types.
We have the following observation regarding buyers of different types.
Observation 1. If a buyer i is of type:
• +: then its true value vi is strictly larger than the price ps on profile s, its reported value
si is not smaller than the price ps, and the buyer is given all the units it can afford by the
mechanism, i.e. all.
• −: then its true value vi is strictly smaller than the price ps on profile s, its reported
value si is not smaller than the price ps, the buyer is given all the units it can afford by
the mechanism, i.e. all and the buyer can afford at least one unit. We will refer to such
buyers as wrongfully interested.
• 0: then there are three cases:
1. the buyer appears irrelevant (i.e. its reported value si is larger than the price ps on
profile s, but it receives 0 units at ps due to insufficient budget).
2. the buyer’s reported value si is not larger than ps and its true value vi is not larger
that ps. If si = ps, then the buyer receives 0 units due to tie-breaking for the
semi-hungry buyers.
3. the buyer’s reported value si is not larger than ps and its true value vi is larger that
ps. If si = ps, then the buyer receives 0 units due to tie-breaking for the semi-hungry
buyers.
We will next prove a series of lemmas, which will be used for proving Theorem 5.2. Note that
in the following, Lemmas 3, 4, 5 and 6 hold for any number of buyers.
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Lemma 3. A type + or type 0 buyer can not best-respond to increase its utility by lowering the
price.
Proof. Let p be the price before the deviation and assume by contradiction that such a buyer
could increase is utility by lowering the price. This implies that at the new price q All-Or-
Nothing after the deviation, the buyer receives as many units as it can afford, i.e. all. Since
all the other reports are fixed, this price would be an envy-free price on the original profile,
before the deviation, contradicting the minimality of p.
Lemma 4. Any type + buyer is already best-responding.
Proof. Let p be the price before the deviation. Since the buyer was getting as many units as
it could afford, i.e. all at price p, it must be getting all the units that it can afford at a lower
price q, outputted by All-Or-Nothing after the deviation, for its utility to be higher. This
is not possible, by Lemma 3.
Lemma 5. A type − buyer can only best-respond to become a type 0 buyer.
Proof. First note that a switch from a − type to a − type (where the utility is still negative
but higher) is not a best-response, since a buyer can always switch to reporting 0. Since 0 is
not an envy-free price, the mechanism will never output it and therefore the buyer will never
be allocated any items at this price, for a utiltiy of 0.
Suppose now that the buyer switches from a − type to a + type and let p be the price
before the deviation and q be the price after the deviation. For buyer i to be a − type buyer, by
Observation 1, it has to be the case that (a) its true value is smaller than p and (b) its reported
value is weakly larger than p and it receives all at price p, and all is at least one unit. For the
buyer to be a + type buyer, it has to receive all at q. By the same argument as the one used
in the proof of Lemma 3, since all the other buyers are fixed, q would be an envy-free price in
the original profile (before the deviation), contradicting the minimality of p.
Lemma 6. The only viable deviations are
1. from type − to type 0. Any such deviation does not increase the price.
2. from type 0 to type +. Any such deviation does not decrease the price.
Proof. The fact that the only viable deviations are from − to + or from 0 to + follow from
Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. In order to argue the changes in price, let p be the price before the
deviation and q be the price after the deviation. Consider first a deviation from type − to type
0 and assume by contradiction that it increases the price, i.e. q < p. By Lemma 1, type −
receives all at price p (and all is a non-zero allocation), but its true valuation is lower than p.
By assumption, q > p and therefore by the monotonicity of All-Or-Nothing (Lemma 2), it
must be the case that buyer i increased its report when deviating. Since everything else is fixed
and the buyer received all before, it still receives all after deviating. Since the sets of hungry
buyers and semi-hungry buyers at price p a has not changed after the deviation, p is still an
envy-free price on the new profile obtained after the deviation, contradicting the minimality of
q.
Next, consider a deviation from a 0 type to a + type. For the buyer to be a 0 type buyer,
there are three possibilities, presented in Observation 1 above. In cases (1) and (2) of the
observation, the buyer can only increase its utility by lowering the price which is not possible
by Lemma 3, therefore these buyers are already best-responding. In case (3), the buyer again
can not lower its utility by lowering the price by Lemma 3, therefore the new price q has to be
at least as large as p.
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Given Lemma 6, it suffices to consider deviations of buyers from type − to type 0 and from
type 0 to type +.
Lemma 7. From a (−,+) or (+,−) state an equilibrium is reached in at most one round.
Proof. By Lemma 4, a + buyer is already best-responding, so any improving deviation will be
carried out by the − buyer. W.l.o.g. let Alice be the − buyer (the argument for the (+,−) state
will follow by symmetry), p be the current price, and q the price after Alice’s best response. By
Lemma 6, the price weakly decreases when a − buyer best responds, so q ≤ p. There are three
cases. If the new state is (0,+), Alice just deviated so by Lemma 2, she is now best-responding.
Bob is a type + buyer, so by Lemma 4 he is also best-responding and the new profile is an
equilibrium. If the new state is (0, 0), then we observe that this case is in fact not possible,
since q ≤ p, Bob received all the units he could afford at p, and his report did not change and
the price did not increase, so he must still receive all the units he can afford at q, which implies
his new utility cannot be zero. If the new state is (0,−) we obtain the same contradiction in
Bob’s utility, so this cannot state is not reachable either. Thus we obtain that the (−,+) state
is either an equilibrium to begin with or results in an equilibrium in one round.
Lemma 8. In (0,+), (+, 0), . . . , (+, 0), (0,+), . . . sequence, if both buyers best-respond consec-
utively without changing the price, then we are at an equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the point in the sequence where the first best-response that does not change
the price occurs and let p be that price. Also, assume without loss of generality that Alice is
best-responding next, hence we are at a (0,+) type profile.
First note that Bob appears (before and after Alice’s deviation) semi-hungry at price p.
This is true because if Bob was
- hungry at price p (and since he was not irrelevant, as he was a type + buyer) and the
price did not change, he would still be a + type buyer after Alice’s deviation.
- uninterested at price p, he wouldn’t be a type + buyer before Alice’s deviation.
Additionally,
- before Alice’s deviation, Bob received as many units as he could afford (i.e. all, with all
being non-zero) at price p. This follows from the fact that Bob was a type + buyer before
Alice’s deviation.
- after Alice’s deviation, Bob receives 0 units at price p. This follows from the fact that
Bob is a type 0 buyer after Alice’s deviation and the price has not changed.
Now consider Alice after her deviation. Since she is a type + buyer, she either
- appears hungry at price p or
- appears semi-hungry at price p and receives as many units as she can afford at p, i.e. all
by the mechanism, where all is a non-zero quantity.
Finally, consider Bob’s best-response (to the (+, 0) profile next in the sequence), which by
assumption, does not change the price p. By the discussion above regarding Alice and Bob
after Alice’s deviation, it follows that Bob can only become a type + buyer if he appears
hungry after his best-response, which is only possible if Alice was semi-hungry before Bob’s
best-response (as otherwise his best-response would result in a (+,+) profile, contradicting the
nature of the sequence). Regardless of what Alice reports next, Bob can not become a type 0
buyer again, if the price remains the same. Therefore, since by assumption the next state is
(0,+), we are at an equilibrium.
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Lemma 9. From a (0,+) or (+, 0) state an equilibrium is always reached.
Proof. The + buyer is already best responding, so an improving deviation can only be obtained
by the 0 buyer. W.l.o.g. let Alice be the 0 buyer, p be the price at the initial (0,+) state, and
q the price after her deviation. By Lemma 6, q ≥ p. The change of state after Alice’s deviation
is given by one of the following:
1. (0,+) → (+,−): Bob received all the units he could afford before and still receives all the
units he can afford in the new state (at a possibly higher price q) but is not wrongfully
interested. By Lemma 6, he best responds with becoming a type 0 buyer and new chosen
price q′ is not larger than q. Therefore, since Bob just best-responded and Alice is still a
+ type at the new price, by Lemma 4, we are at an equilibrium.
2. (0,+) → (+,+): By Lemma 4, both buyers are already best responding, so this is an
equilibrium.
3. (0,+)→ (+, 0): If Bob has no improving deviation, we reached an equilibrium. Otherwise,
after the deviation Bob will become a type +, yielding one of the states:
a. (+,+): An equilibrium by Lemma 4.
b. (−,+): Leads to an equilibrium by Lemma 7.
c. (0,+): This is the case of interest, where the price increased as a result of Bob’s best-
response and Bob became + while turning Alice into 0. If Alice has any best-response
at this point, she can only become a + as a result of it while turning Bob into one
of −, 0,+. If Bob becomes − or +, we fall into cases 3.b and 3.a, respectively, which
lead to an equilibrium.
Thus to complete the argument we must show that an alternating sequence of the
form (0,+), (+, 0), . . . , (+, 0), (0,+), . . . will converge to an equilibrium. By Lemma
6, the price cannot decrease along such a sequence. If both buyers best-respond along
the sequence without changing the price, then we are at an equilibrium by Lemma.
Otherwise, if the price is increased in every round along the sequence, the process
must stop before the price is higher than the sum of budgets (at such a price no buyer
can afford anything, and at least one of them had strictly positive utility before).
Lemma 10. From a (0, 0) state an equilibrium is always reached.
Proof. W.l.o.g. Alice is best responding from this state. If the new state is (+,−), we will
reach an equilibrium by Lemma 7. If the new state is (+,+) then both buyers are already best
responding. (recall that by Lemma 4, a + buyer is already best responding.). If the new state
is (+, 0), then after Alice’s deviation, Bob is a 0 type and by Lemma 6, he will best-respond (if
he can) to become a + type. If he does not change Alice’s type, we have a (+,+) profile which
by Lemma 4, is an equilibrium. The two remaining cases for the profile obtained after Bob’s
deviation are (−,+), which leads to an equilibrium by Lemma 7 and (0,+), which leads to an
equilibrium by Lemma 9. Thus an equilibrium is always reached as required.
Lemma 11. From a (−, 0) or (0,−) state an equilibrium is always reached if the − buyer is
best responding next.
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Proof. W.l.o.g. Alice is the − buyer and Bob the 0 buyer; the (0,−) case holds by symmetry.
By the condition in the lemma, Alice is best responding next. The change of state after her
deviation is given by one of the following:
1. (−, 0) → (0,+): Alice just deviated so she is best responding. Bob is +, so he is already
best responding by Lemma 4 and the new profile is an equilibrium.
2. (−, 0)→ (0, 0): By Lemma 9, this state always leads to an equilibrium.
3. (−, 0)→ (0,−): Since Alice just moved from − to 0, it’s Bob’s turn to deviate. Bob’s type
is −, so after his deviation he will become 0 and the price will weakly decrease. We have
several subcases depending on Alice’s type after Bob’s deviation. If the new state is:
a. (0, 0): by Lemma 9 we reach an equilibrium.
b. (+, 0): then we are at an equilibrium since Bob just best responded and Alice is already
best responding since she is a + type.
c. (−, 0): then if we do not enter one of the states above (a) or (b) at all, there exists an
alternating sequence of deviations where each state in the sequence is (−, 0) or (0,−).
Since the initial state is such that the − buyer is best responding, the buyer with −
type will always be the one deviating along such a sequence. First, by Lemma 6, the
price weakly decreases with every such deviation, since the deviator always moves
from − to 0. Second, whenever the price stays constant in such a deviation, the
deviator must decrease his reported utility. Thus along every such sequence either
the price decreases or the reported valuation of the deviator. This means that the
process stops in finite time.
Thus we reach an equilibrium in all cases as required.
Combining Lemmas 11 and 13, we obtain that an equilibrium is always reached from a (−, 0)
or (0,−) state.
Lemma 12. From a (−, 0) or (0,−) state an equilibrium is always reached.
Proof. This is an immediate corollary of Lemmas 11 and 13.
Lemma 13. From a (−, 0) or (0,−) state an equilibrium is always reached if the 0 buyer is
best responding next.
Proof. W.l.o.g. Alice is the 0 buyer, so the state is (0,−). Let p be the current price and q
the price after her deviation. By Lemma 6, q ≥ p. If the new state is (+,−), we reach an
equilibrium by Lemma 7. If the new state is (+, 0), we reach an equilibrium by Lemma 9. If
the new state is (+,+): By Lemma 4, at (+,+) both buyers are already best-responding.
Lemma 14. From a (−,−) state an equilibrium is always reached.
Proof. W.l.o.g., Alice is deviating next. By Lemma 5, she will be become a 0 type. If the new
state is (0,+), then since Alice just deviated she is already best-responding, and Bob is also
best responding by Lemma 4, so the new profile is an equilibrium. If the new state is (0, 0), we
reach an equilibrium by Lemma 10, and if it is (0,−), then we reach an equilibrium by Lemma
12.
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We can now prove the convergence theorem.
Proof of Theorem C.1. [5.2 in main text] LetM = (m,B,v) be a market with two buyers, Alice
and Bob. Consider any strategy profile s = (s1, s2). By Lemma 4, only buyers with strictly
negative or zero utility at s can have improving deviations from s. Thus if s is a (+,+) state, it
is already an equilibrium. Otherwise, by Lemmas 14, 12, 7, 10, 12, the best response sequence
stops when initiated from any of the states (−,−), (−, 0), (0,−), (−,+), (+,−), (0, 0), (0,+),
(+, 0).
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